

# **The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and its implication for the Europe-China Relations**

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\* The views expressed in this presentation are those of the presenter and are not to be construed as representing those of IFAN, KNDA, and Korean government.

# What is this war about for Europeans?

- ***War effort.*** all that is being done to win a war
- Survival
- War to avoiding setting a precedent for invasion of Europe geographically and politically
- War to express European (soft and economic) power/unity (within Europe and across Atlantic) toward Russia, China and beyond
- War to protect core values pursued since WWII

# **Change of Europe strategic thinking due to the Russia-Ukraine War**

- NATO/EU Enlargement
- Attitude to Russia
- Attitude to the US
- Attitude to China
- Attitude to military buildup in Europe
- Searching for and confirming (true) like-minded partners

# Short-term change /Long-term transition

- European strategic culture(s)
  - Role of France, Germany, and the UK
- Validity of strategic autonomy
  - NATO interoperability and the EU Permanent Structured Cooperation
  - NATO permanent stationing of combat forces in the Central and Eastern Europe
- Linking Euro-Atlantic security with Indo-Pacific security
  - European Indo-Pacific strategies, strategic approach to China,
  - Division of labour between the EU and NATO?
  - Treating China as a challenge and/or threat?

## **Before the War: US-China Rivalry and Europe's Pivot to Asia**

- Since 2018, European countries have been rapidly establishing their Indo-Pacific strategies; these include those of France, Germany, the Netherlands, the EU and most recently Italy.
- France (May 2019)
- Germany (September 2020)
- The Netherlands (November 2020)
- The European Union (April 2021, and more in Autumn 2021)
- Italy (January 2022)

- Those European IP approaches vary in terms of contents, rhetoric, and policy areas. Especially, the weight given to (traditional) security issues vary. But they all have three things in common.
  - (1) Importance of the EU
  - (2) Concern for the rise of China and instability of the region (implicitly or explicitly)
  - (3) Importance of multi-polarity

# Economic response to competition from China

- Investment Screening Regulation', Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union), in force from Oct. 11, 2020.
- EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, negotiated since 2013, agreed at the end of 2020. Not yet ratified because of EU sanctions over China's treatment of its Uyghur population in March 2021 and China's retaliatory sanctions against the EU.

# Cooperation with the US in response to China's rise

- December 2019: London Declaration of the 2019 NATO Summit: "We recognise that China's growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance".
- January 2020: Joint Statement of the Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of Japan, the United States and the European Union  
Washington, D.C., 14 January, 2020 (on industrial subsidies)
- June 2020; Agreeing to establish 'EU-US Dialogue on China'.



# The EU-US Trade and Technology Council

- The first meeting of **the EU-US Trade and Technology Council** on 29 September 2021.
- Responding the EU's proposal to Biden Administration
- Based on the experience of the Transatlantic Economic Council in 2007 launched on Angela Merkel's initiative
- Bilateral operation but with multilateral/global implications
- **Main goals of the TTC**
  - ✓ Expand and deepen bilateral trade and investment
  - ✓ Avoid new technical barriers to trade
  - ✓ Cooperate on key policies on technology, digital issues and supply chains
  - ✓ Support collaborative research
  - ✓ Cooperate on the development of compatible and international standards
  - ✓ Facilitate cooperation on regulatory policy and enforcement
  - ✓ Promote innovation and leadership by EU and US firms

# TTC 10 Working groups

- Technology standards cooperation
- Climate and Clean tech
- Secure supply chains
- Information and Communication Technology and Services (ICTS) Security and Competitiveness
- Data governance and technology platforms
- The misuse of technology threatening security and human rights
- Export controls
- Investment screening
- Promoting SME access to and use of digital technologies
- Global trade challenges

## **Jens Stoltenberg, NATO's secretary-general, entrusted an independent Reflection Group with the task of answering a fundamental question:**

- how can NATO, as an effective military alliance, become stronger as a political alliance? "NATO 2030: United For A New Era" on 1 December 2020 to NATO foreign ministers.
1. The security environment in which NATO operates – dominated by great power competition and rising global risks – has changed since 2010, calling for an update of the alliance's decade-old strategic concept. (Russia, China, the southern flank, technology) For NATO to remain relevant to its members and contribute to international stability, the regional alliance must acquire a global perspective.
  2. NATO will certainly remain a military alliance but, to retain public support, it will need to more actively support human security and the resilience of democratic societies.
  3. Strengthening NATO's internal cohesion.

# NATO and Indo-Pacific Region

- NATO also began to address the Indo-Pacific issues.
- In 2019 London Summit Declaration: "We recognise that China's growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance. "
- In November 2020, 'NATO 2030: United for a New Era Analysis and Recommendations of the Reflection Group Appointed by the NATO Secretary General'.
- NATO-Japan Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme updated in June 2020: "NATO may consider contributing assets to Japanese exercises in the Indo-Pacific region, where NATO participation would be appropriate."
- In December 2020, the four Asia-Pacific partners (i.e. Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand) participated for the first time in a NATO Foreign Ministerial Meeting. NATO Foreign Ministers discussed the shift in the global balance of power and the rise of China with the four Asia-Pacific partners, as well as with Finland, Sweden and European Union High Representative/ Vice President of the European Commission.
- In April 2022, the Asia-Pacific four partners attended another NATO Foreign Ministerial Meeting.

# Military Cooperation in 2021

- “ARC21” in May 2021: the first joint Japan-France-US drills in Japan. Later to be joined by Australia.
- Also UK (Carrier Strike Group led by HMS QE with participation of the US and the Netherlands) and Germany (Frigate Hamburg)

# The EU's response after the war

- "A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence ( 24 March 2022). For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security"
  - "a roadmap for becoming a stronger security and defence actor" (CEPS, 2022)
- Not dramatic changes in assessment about China on security issues. But the EU as a security actor vis-à-vis China.

# 1. THE WORLD WE FACE

## The return of power politics in a contested multipolar world

- ....China is a partner for cooperation, an economic competitor and a systemic rival. With China, we can address matters of global concern such as climate change. China is increasingly both involved and engaged in regional tensions. The asymmetry in the openness of our markets and societies have led to growing concerns as regards to reciprocity, economic competition and resilience. China tends to limit access to its market and seeks to promote globally its own standards. It pursues its policies including through its growing presence at sea and in space, as well as by using cyber tools and displaying hybrid tactics. In addition, China has been substantially developing its military means and aims to have completed the overall modernisation of its armed forces by 2035, impacting regional and global security. China's development and integration into its region, and the world at large, will mark the rest of this century. We need to ensure that this happens in a way that will contribute to uphold global security and not contradict the rules-based international order and our interests and values. This requires strong unity amongst us and working closely with other regional and global partners.

# **1. THE WORLD WE FACE (continued)**

## **Our strategic environment**

- A new centre of global competition has emerged in the Indo-Pacific, where geopolitical tensions endanger the rules-based order in the region, and put pressure on global supply chains. The EU has a crucial geopolitical and economic interest in stability and security in the region. We will therefore protect our interests in the region, also by ensuring that international law prevails in the maritime and other domains. China is the EU's second biggest trading partner and a necessary one to address global challenges. But there is also a growing reaction to its increasingly assertive regional behaviour.



## 5. PARTNER


### Tailored bilateral partnerships

- Through our EU Indo-Pacific Strategy, we will seek to promote an open and rules-based regional security architecture, including secure sea lines of communication, capacity-building and enhanced naval presence in the Indo-Pacific. We already have constructive security and defence consultations and security cooperation with Indo-Pacific countries such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Vietnam. We are committed to working with like-minded partners through operational cooperation on the ground, particularly where these efforts support regional peace and security structures and initiatives. The EU has conducted a series of joint naval exercises and port calls, most recently with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Djibouti and India. Such live exercises will become standard practice and help us ensure a secure and open Indo-Pacific. We will continue to pursue dialogue and consultations with **China** where this is in our interests, especially on issues such as respect for the international law of the sea, peaceful settlement of disputes and a rules-based international order and human rights.


## Europeans think a cold war with Russia is more real than with China.

In per cent.

■ Cold war happening ■ Not sure ■ Cold war not happening



Between the EU and China



Between the EU and Russia

Jointly for all 12 countries polled. Excluding those who responded 'Don't know'; these represented 20 per cent and 19 per cent of the total for respective options. Question asked: "A cold war is a type of conflict that doesn't involve direct military action but instead may include economic or political acts (e.g. sanctions, propaganda, proxy conflicts etc), such as the cold war between the West and the Soviet Union in the second half of the twentieth century. To what extent, if at all, do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? (a) There is a cold war between the EU and China, (b) There is a cold war between the EU and Russia."

Source: Datapraxis and YouGov (DE, FR, DK, ES, PL, PT, SE, IT, AT), AnalitiQs (NL), Alpha (BG), and Szondaphone (HU) 2021 © All rights reserved


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# WHAT EUROPEANS THINK ABOUT THE USCHINA COLD WAR


Ivan Krastev, Mark Leonard September 2021, ECFR Policy Brief

**A majority of Europeans believe that there is a new cold war between the US and Russia.** In per cent.


■ Cold war happening ■ Not sure ■ Cold war not happening



Between own country and Russia




Between the EU and Russia




Between US and Russia

**More than two-thirds of Europeans believe that the US is in a new cold war with China.** In per cent.


■ Cold war happening   ■ Not sure   ■ Cold war not happening



Between own country and China



Between the EU and China




Between the US and China

<b>EU Members With Significant Borders With Non-EU States</b>	
<b>EU Member</b>	<b>Bordering With</b>
Austria	Switzerland
Bulgaria	North Macedonia, Serbia, Turkey
Croatia	Bosnia & Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia
Estonia	Russia
Finland	Russia
Greece	Albania, North Macedonia, Turkey
Hungary	Serbia, Ukraine
Latvia	Belarus, Russia
Lithuania	Belarus, Russia
Poland	Belarus, Russia, Ukraine
Romania	Moldova, Ukraine, Serbia
Slovakia	Ukraine

## Putting your money where your mouth is

Countries that would support a maritime security pillar of the EU's Indo-Pacific strategy by...



Question: "If an EU Indo-Pacific strategy were to be adopted with a maritime security pillar, would your country be willing to support it by..."

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〈표 1〉 EU 인도태평양 전략의 해양 안보 축을 지원하겠다는 국가들

지원 방안	국가 수	비고
인도적 지원 및 재난 구조 능력 강화	22	
EU 프로그램 재정 지원	13	
'항행의 자유 작전'에 기여	12	벨기에, 사이프러스, 에스토니아, 프랑스, 이탈리아, 리투아니아, 룩셈부르크, 폴란드, 포르투갈, 루마니아, 스페인, 스웨덴
양자 협력 프로그램 재정 지원	12	
무기 수출 재조정	7	
지역에 전함 파견	4	벨기에, 독일, 룩셈부르크, 스페인
군대 주둔 추진 또는 증강	2	독일, 스페인

질문: “EU 인도태평양 전략이 해상 안보 축으로서 채택된다면, 당신의 국가는 다음과 같은 방안으로 적극 지원하겠는가.”

\*출처: Frédéric Grare and Manisha Reuter (2021) 'MOVING CLOSER: EUROPEAN VIEWS OF THE INDO-PACIFIC', ECFR/413. September 2021, European Council on Foreign Relations. ECFR. [ecfr.eu](https://ecfr.eu)

# Changing security environment for Korea

- Such movements is changing the security environment of Korea rapidly even though so far it has refused to choose between the US and China with a kind of implicit attempt for strategic ambiguity.
- Facing a challenge to choose between the US and China maybe a new experience for Europe, but old for Korea.
- Under the shadow of economic reprisals from China, Korea faces challenges to pursue the value-based diplomacy, enhance peaceful solution for the Korean Peninsula, and enhance its own security with the US-Korea alliance simultaneously.



# Implications for Korea

- Europe's increasing security engagement in the Indo-Pacific Region, especially in Northeast Asia, is making Korea's strategic ambiguity more and more difficult to maintain.
- European approaches combine three elements:
  - (1) economically, "open strategic autonomy"
  - (2) politically, value-based diplomacy
  - (3) security-wise, transatlantic alliance
- Other than how to maintain strategic ambiguity, what Korea is facing is how to avoid strategic isolation especially on Element 2. So far the main concern for Korea has been on Elements 1 and 3 with the focus on power politics. But Element 2 is becoming crucial for making a long-term strategy. Addressing Element 2 to China and mitigating its economic reprisal at the same time is a big new challenge for Korea.